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IN THE SUPREME·COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE PEARCE, . . 
Plaintiff-Appellant, . . 
vs. . . Case No. 18,376 
MARTIN J. WISTISEN and 
RICHARD OVESON, 
. 
. 
. 
. 
Defendants-Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 ON IMPUTED LIABILITY UNDER UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED §73-18-18 WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In State v. Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 291 P.2d 1093, 1095 
(1971), the Court states the general rule that: 
A refusal to give an instruction cannot be 
the basis for reversal, unless the jury was 
insufficiently advised of the issue they were 
to determine, or it appears that they were 
confused or misled to the prejudice of the 
person complaining. 
491 P.2d at 1095. (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff agrees with the rule as stated, but as to the 
instant action, plaintiff asserts that the exceptions outlined 
iri the rule and emphasized above are applicable and controlling 
in the instant case. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 6 was the only instruc-
tion which would have given the jury an understanding of the law 
on vicarious liability as set out in Utah Code Ann. §73-18-18. No 
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instruction given by the Court conveyed any notion whatsoever of 
the statutory vicarious liability of the defendants for the 
negligent acts of Kevin Histisen. 
In the absence of such an instruction it is clear that the 
jury was insufficiently advised as to the law on vicarous lia-
bility which was a key issue for the jury's determination. As a 
consequence, the verdict was the product of a confused and misled 
jury, which resulted in substantial prejudice to the plaintiff. 
Based on the authority of Ouzounian, the Court's failure to give 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 6 is a basis for reversal. 
Defendants' assertion that the Court's Instruction No. 5 was 
an adequate substitution for Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
No. 6 completely misses the central issue in dispute. The 
Court's Instruction No. 5 states: 
In this case the plaintiff has the burden of 
persuading you that the defendants Martin J. 
Wistisen and/or Richard Oveson and/or the 
boat operator Kevin Wistisen was negligent 
and that such negligence was a proximate 
cause of the death of Evan Pearce. 
The above cited instruction informs the jury only that the plain-
tiff has the burden of proving that one or both of the defendants, 
or Kevin Wistisen was negligent and that such negligence was the 
proximate cause of the death of Evan Pearce. Nowhere in the 
instruction is found the least indication that the negligence of 
Kevin Histisen was to be imputed by law to the defendants. 
Nowhere in the instruction is found any explanation concerning 
the relevance of the negligence of a non-party. The fact that 
the jury found the defendants to be negligent in no way demon-
strates that the jury found said negligence by imputing the 
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negligence of Kevin \listisen. There is no way in which the jury 
could have extracted the notion of vicarious liability from the 
instructions they received. 
Absent an adequate instruction on imputed liability, the 
Jury could easily have found, as they did, that the negligence of 
the named defendants was not the proximate cause of the death of 
Evan Pearce. It is obvious that the lack of instruction con-
cerning the imputability and relevance of Kevin Wistisen's 
negligence created confusion in the jury and prduced error so 
substantial as to require reversal. 
Defendants have suggested that it is the Court's failure to 
mention the term ''vicarious liability" that is the chief concern 
of the plaintiff. Plaintiff is little concerned whether the 
words "vicarious liability" were used in the instruction, as long 
as the instruction conveyed the concept of the vicarious lia-
bility doctrine. Such was not the case. No substantive communica-
tion of the doctrine was ever made to the jury in the Court's 
instructions, not even implicitly. Defendants have repeatedly 
stated that since the Court's instruction concerned the negli-
gence of both defendants and Kevin Wistisen, the plaintiff's 
request for a vicarious liability instruction was satisfied. 
Defendants apparently misunderstand the vicarious liability 
doctrine. The point is not that the negligence of Kevin Wistisen 
is involved, but that it be imputed to defendants. In light of 
the fact that not even the most vague notion of the vicarious 
liability doctrine was presented to the jury, plaintiff's request 
for reversal on this point is indeed one of "substance" rather 
than "one of form only" as asserted by defendants. 
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Defendants rely on the case of Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 
455 (Utah 1981), and cite the following language therefrom: 
Nevertheless, the court cannot be said to 
have failed to properly instruct the jury 
when requested instructions are fully 
covered in other instructions given. 
626 P.2d at 458-459. (Emphasis added). The. language of Watters 
clearly indicates that when requested instructions are not fully 
covered in other instructions, the court has failed to properly 
instruct the jury. This is exactly what occurred in the instant 
case and, therefore, reversible error was committed by the trial 
court. 
Defendants' brief further argues that since the jury ·found 
both defendants and Kevin Wistisen negligent that "appellant re-
ceived the finding of negligence which he ~ought." Defendant~ 
have misunderstood plaintiff's case. Plaintiff's-purpose in re-
questing their proposed Instruction No. 6 was not to show that 
Kevin Wistisen and the two named defendants were independently 
negligent, but rather to show that Kevin Wistisen's negligence 
was imputable by law to the named defendants. In view of the 
fact that Kevin Wistisen is not a defendant to this action, a 
finding of negligence on his part is absolutely useless to plain-
tiff's case unless the jury were to understand that Kevin 
Wistisen's negligence was to be imputed to the two named defen-
dants. Since not one scintilla of imputed or vicarious liability 
doctrine \las present in any of the Court's instructions, the jury 
could not have found the named defendants liable for the negli-
gence of Kevin Wistisen. Absent an adequate instruction by the 
Court on vicarious liability the plaintiff did not and could not 
have received the finding of negligence which he sought. 
-4-
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Based on the authority and analysis above, plaintiff's case 
was substantially prejudiced by the Court's failure to give his 
Requested Instruction No. 6 and said refusal by the Court requires 
reversal of the trial court's verdict. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED BY THE 
ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING ALCOHOL 
CONSUMPTION BY THE DECEASED, EVAN PEARCE. 
Plaintiff has asserted, ever since he learned of defendants' 
intentions to introduce evidence at trial concerning the illegal 
purchase and consumption of alcohol by Evan Pearce, that such 
evidence would be prejudicial and inflammatory. Although defen-
dants conceded to the trial court that they could not prove how 
much alcohol the deceased, Evan Pearce, had consumed, or that he 
was ever intoxicated, defendants were intent on introducing such 
evidence to inflame the jury and prejudice them against the young 
man. 
Defendants assert that they were entitled to introduce the 
evidence as rebuttal, stating that plaintiff brought up the 
matter first. (Brief of Respondents at 18-19). This assertion 
is grossly false. Defendants presented both the purchase and 
consumption of the alcohol to the jury in their opening statement 
to the jury. (R. at 285.) This was clearly not by way of 
rebuttal, but rather, was the primary and principal means by 
which the jury was exposed to this prejudicial and inflammatory 
evidence. 
The defendants discussion of Bach v. Penn_ Central Transporta-
tion Co., 502 F.2d 1117 {6th Cir. 1974) fails to recognize the 
import of Bach. While it is true that Bach states the general 
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rule that evidence of drinking before a fatal accident is gener-
ally relevant to the jury's consideration of contributory negli-
gence, the holding in Bach carves out a major exception to that 
general rule which is directly applicable in the instant case. 
The court in Bach held, with respect to the introduction of 
evidence that alcohol consumed prior to-a fatal accident: 
[T]he relevance of such evidence disappears 
if the drinking occurred so long before the 
accident that the alcohol could no longer 
have any effect on the decedent's conduct. 
The probative. value of such evidence must be 
closely scrutinized to avoid the p6ssibility 
of prejudice to the party charged with 
negligence • • • This evidence was much too 
remote and uncertain to be of effective 
probative value on this issue of contributory 
negligence. 
502 F.2d at 1121 (emphasis added). 
In the instant case the court failed to closely scrutinize 
the probative value of the evidence of prior consumption of 
alcohol by Evan Pearce. The court failed to consider that any 
consumption of alcohol did not contribute to the creation of the 
predicament in which Evan Pearce was placed. The court failed to 
consider that there was no expert testimony of any kind which 
would have tended to show that Evan Pearce was being affected by 
alcohol in his system or by the after effects of alcohol which 
had been in his system. The court failed to consider that the 
testimony of Rod Hunt could not quantify the alcohol consumed by 
Evan Pearce in any way save to say that he was "involved'' (R. at 
295) in the activity of drinking while at the party. The court 
failed to consider that the illegal purchase of the alcohol by 
Evan Pearce was completely irrelevant to his condition at the 
time of the incident in question. 
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The argument forwarded by the defendants with respect to the 
Bach case is that the drinking in the Bach case may have been 
more remote in time than the drinking in the present case. In 
that regard, defendants cite the Record at page 548 (Brief of 
Respondent at 2-3) to the effect that Evan Pearce's drinking 
continued until 9:00 a.m. of the morning of June 1, 1979. Evan's 
drowning occurred sometime between 7:00 p.m. June 1, 1979 and 
June 2, 1979. The Record at page 548 does not support that 
conclusion, but only supports the conclusion that Evan Pearce may 
have been drinking until 6:00 a.rn. or 6:30 a.m. of June 1, 1979, 
some 12 1/2 to 13 hours prior to the earliest possible time of 
drowning. That evidence is remote and not related by other 
testimony t6 the time of Evan's death. Comparisons of varying 
degrees of remoteness does not invalidate the clear and logical 
import of the Bach case which emphasizes that evidence of the 
consumption of alcohol has ~uch a propensity to prejudice that· 
the court must make a special examination of such evidence and 
must require appropriate foundational testimony to establish the 
probative value thereof. 
At trial the defendants did not show or even suggest that 
the deceased, Evan Pearce, was under the influence of alcohol at 
the time of the accident. Defendants frankly admitted that they 
could not prove any adverse effects on Evan Pearce by any alleged 
alcohol consumption. In spite of this, and in spite of the fact 
that any consumption would have occurred substantially before the 
accident, thereby making it remote in time, defendants were 
int~n£ on p~esenting tb the jury evidence which could· only pre-
judice the plaintiff and which was without any probative value. 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Because the evidence was perceived as so damning, it was the 
first evidence presented by defendants in their case in chief. 
Defendants attempt to sidestep the prejudice issue by 
·asserting that since plaintiff did not accept a continuance to 
depose defendants' witness who was to introduce the prejudicial 
evidence, plaintif.f has waived his right to argue the prejudice 
of ·the evidence. No amount of preparation or foresight could 
overcome the damaging effects of the evidence which was intro-
duced concerning Evan Pearce's illegal purchase and consumption 
of alcohol. In view of the predominant community attitudes and 
biases against drinking in the community from which the jury was 
drawn, and the moral stigma associated with it, the prejudicial 
effect of the evidence in question is obvious. 
Concededly, the determination as to undue prejudice is one 
to be made by the trial court in its sound discretion. The facts 
of the present case show that the trial court clearly abused its 
discretion in allowing the admission of the evidence in question. 
The admission of the evidence in question, which plaintiff 
asserts had a disastrously prejudicial and inflammatory effect 
upon the decision of the jury, was reversible error. 
POINT III 
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 REGARDING THE PRESUMPTION THAT EVAN 
PEARCE WAS EXERCISING DUE CARE FOR HIS OWN SAFETY WAS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Defendants' argument against plaintiff's contention that the 
court's failure to give Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 13 
was reversible error consists of an enumeration of several alleged 
acts of negligence by the deceased, Evan Pearce. (Brief of 
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Respondents at 11.) 
The defendants list seven items of the deceased Evan Pearce's 
alleged negligence. (Brief of Respondents at 11-12). The first 
four items defendants list were acts or circumstances which 
occurred prior .to the time of the actual emergency, that is, 
prior to the time Kevin Wistisen ran over the ski rope and aban-
doned the boat in the wind without electrical power and without 
anchor. Therefore, it is impossible to say that, with respect to 
the emergency, these acts constituted a failure by Evan Pearce to 
exercise due care for his own safety. In other words, had Kevin 
Wistisen not created the emergency in question these prior acts 
by Evan Pearce would be completely irrelevant with respect to any 
notion that.he was not exercising due care for his own safety. 
Defendants' claim that these first four enumerated acts 
show that Evan Pearce was not exercising due care for his own 
safety suggests a striking analogy to the "thin skull" doctrine. 
The core of the doctrine, as set out in 57 Am.Jur 2d, Negligence 
§ 160, P. 522, is as follows: 
[T]he established rule is that where the 
result of an accident is to bring into acti-
vity a dormant or incipient disease, or one 
to which the injured person is predisposed, 
the negligence which caused the accident is 
the proximate cause of the disability, and if 
a latent condition itself does not cause pain 
and suffering, but that condition plus an 
injury causes such pain and suffering, the 
injury, and not the latent condition, is the 
proximate cause thereof. Where such a pre-
existing condition is shown, the rule is that 
the negligent actor is subject to liability 
for harm to another although a physical 
condition of the other which is neither known 
nor should be known to the actor makes the 
injury greater than that which the actor as a 
reasonable man should have foreseen as a 
probable result of his conduct. Under this 
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rule, which has sometimes been referred to 
as the ''thin skull" doctrine, the tortfeasor 
takes his victim as he finds him. 
In applying this rule by analogy, it is clear that defen-
dants cannot assert as negligence any acts by Evan Pearce or 
conditions from which he suffered, which occurred or existed 
before Kevin Wistisen created the emergency by running over the 
rope and abandoning the boat. In essence, it is irrelevant 
whether Evan Pearce was tired or in some other condition prior to 
the time when Kevin Wistisen created the emergency, because at 
the time of the emergency defendants must "take their victim as 
they find him." The only acts by Evan Pearce which defendants 
may cite as contributory negligence, and use to oppose the pre-
sumption that Evan Pearce used due care for his own safety, would 
be acts which occurred after Kevin lJistisen created the emergency. 
The last three enumerated acts.by Evan Pearce occurred after. 
Kevin Wistisen created the emergency, but are clearly not acts 
which a reasonable mind could construe as constituting a failure 
to exercise due care for one's own safety. 
First, defendants cite the removal of the life jacket by 
Evan Pearce in an attempt to reach the boat as a failure to 
exercise. due care for his own safety. On the contrary, this act 
constituted a valiant last-ditch effort by one who was intensly 
interested in securing his own safety. Evan Pearce had made 
several attempts to swim to the boat with the life jacket on. 
The wind was blowing the boat away from him faster than he could 
swim with the jacket on. He therefore made one last calculated 
effort to reach the boat without the hindering and obstructing 
effect of the jacket. He swam to the boat without the jacket but 
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even the removal of the jacket did not sufficiently aid him and 
he was unable to reach the boat. 
Second, defendants cite Evan Pearce's failure to adjust the 
life jacket which was thrown out to him as a failure to exercise 
due care for his own safety. Evan Pearce did put the jacket on, 
but it was improperly undersized. ·(R. at 517). Even if it were 
to be assumed that the jacket could have been adjusted, it 
obviously was not adjustable while the wearer was wearing the 
jacket. To take the jacket off for adjustment would have only 
created a potential additional hazard to Evan Pearce's life. 
Third, defendants credit the separation of Evan Pearce and 
Kevin llistisen as being the sole result of action by Evan Pearce. 
Again it must be remembered that these boys were faced with a 
dire emergency. The water in which they were stranded was very 
cold and it was getting dark very rapidly. Evan Pearce's efforts 
to reach shore as quickly as possible can only be construed as an 
effort to secure his own safety. 
Referring again to Haman v. Prudential Insurance Company of 
America, 415 P.2d 305, 311 (Idaho 1966); which was cited in 
detail in appellant's brief, the court held: 
[I]f reasonable minds might differ as to the 
conclusions to be drawn from the evidertce 
opposing the presumption, the matter should 
be submitted to the jury and the jury informed 
as to the presumption • • • 
(Emphasis added.) 
Concededly, whether a prirna facia case opposing the presump-
tion has been made is a question for the Court. Based on the 
facts of the instant case, the extreme emergency faced by Evan 
Pearce and the efforts Evan Pearce made to secure his own safety, 
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the plaintiff asserts that the Court abused its discretion in 
ruling that sufficient evidence had been adduced by defendants to 
constitute a prima facia case. Plaintiff's assertion rests on 
the ease with which reasonable minds could readily have drawn 
conclusions with respect to the actions by Evan Pearce finding 
that he was indeed exercising due care for his own safety. 
It is abundantly clear from the above analysis that reasonable 
minds could have drawn different conclusions from the evidence 
defendants adduced at trial in opposition to the presumption. It 
is indeed likely that reasonable minds might conclude that all 
actions by Evan Pearce were highly motivated by a desire to 
secure and exercise due care for his own safety. Sufficient 
evidence to make a prima facia case in opposition to the presump-
tion was not adduced by defendants. The presumption should, 
therefore, have been submitted to the jury and the Court's failure 
to do so in this action constitutes reversible error. 
POINT IV 
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO 
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF AN ANCHOR ABOARD THE 
BOAT IN ISSUE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Plaintiff presented two theories to the.trial court which he 
asserts required the trial court to give an instruction concerning 
the requirement of an anchor aboard the boat in question. 
Plaintiff's first theory is based upon Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-18-8 (1980) and 4 Utah Admin. R. § A60-01-3{3)(b)(l2)(1975), 
which state that the boat in question should have been equipped 
with "an anchor and line of sufficient weight and length to 
securely anchor such vessel." It was disputed whether the beach-
ability of the boat, under the circumstances present on Utah Lake 
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at the time of the accident, would subject the boat to compliance 
with this requirement. Plaintiff asserts that defendants' evi-
dence was not sufficient to exempt it from the operation of the 
statute and the administrative regulation and, therefore, the 
lack of an anchor was negligence. 
Plaintiff's second theory is based upon rules and regula-
tions promulgated by the state of Utah, through its Division of 
Parks and Recreation. Plaintiff contends that the rules and 
regulations made it "essential" that an anchor be on board the 
boat in question and that pursuant to these rules and regulations 
the lack of an anchor is evidence of negligence by the defendants. 
In otherwords, the requirement of an anchor on board the boat was 
a "safety standard," ·the deviation from which constitutes negli-
gence. 
Plaintiff relied on the authority in Wheeler v. Jones, 19 
Utah 2d 392, 431 P.2d 985 (1967), in which the plaintiff sued for 
injurie~ which he had received as a result of colliding with a 
glass door owned and maintained by defendants. Plaintiffs were 
allowed to enter into evidence FHA regulations on the necessity 
of having either safety glass or a horizontal metal bar in the 
door. The Utah Supreme Court allowed the evidence, holding that 
it was "one of the standards of the community in determining 
whether or not the defendants were negligent." (Emphasis added). 
The court in Wheeler continued by stating: 
While it is true that the weight of authority 
is against allowing regulations such as those 
of FHA to be given in evidence, yet there is 
a respectable authority permitting such 
evidence to be received~ 
431 P.2d at 987. 
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A trend exists in the law which allows codes or standards of 
safety issued or sponsered by governmental bodies to be admitted 
into evidence on the issue of negligence. As evidenced by the 
decision in Wheeler, Utah is among the minority that allows such 
codes and safety standards to be introduced into evidence. 
In the instant case, plaintiff established by introduction 
of Exhibit 7, that safety regulations exist in the· state of Utah 
which would make an anchor an essential piece of equipment on 
board the boat in question. Based on the authority in Wheeler 
and the safety standards promulgated by the Utah Division of 
Parks and Recreation, the lack of an anchor on board the boat in 
question was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 8 concerned the 
specific safety regulations promulgated by the Utah Division of 
Parks and Recreation. Since the safety equipment list was intro-
duced into evidence without objection, it was error for the court 
not to give Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 8 in order to 
allow the jury to properly evaluate the evidence. 
The court's failure to give an appropriate instruction on 
plaintiff's theory that an anchor was required aboard the boat 
constitutes prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 6 on the vicarious 
liability of the named defendants for the negligence of Kevin 
Wistisen as a minor operator of the boat was not given by the 
trial court. The plaintiff has demonstrated conclusively that no 
instruction given by the court, viewed in any light, communicated 
the doctrine of imputed liability so that the jury could have 
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found defendants liable for the negligence of Kevin Wistisen. 
The fact that the jury found negligence on the part of defendants, 
absent Plaintiff's Instruction No. 6, does not demonstrate that 
the jury imputed the negligence of Kevin Wistisen to them. Under 
the law, U.C.A. 73-18-8, the plaintiff was entitled to this 
instruction. 
The plaintiff was substantially prejudiced by the erroneous 
admission of evidence concerning consumption of alcohol by the 
deceased, Evan Pearce. Defendants introduced evidence at trial 
that Evan Pearce illegally purchased and consumed alcohol some-
time prior to the accident in issue. Defendants introduced such 
testimony in spite of the fact that they did not, and frankly 
admitted that they could not, show that Evan Pearce was intoxi-
cated or in any way affected by consumption of alcohol at the 
time af the accident. Defendants introduced this evidenc~ through 
the first witness for the defense for the purpose of adducing 
evidence which would prejudice and inflame the jury against Evan 
Pearce. The instant case clearly falls within rule stated in 
Bach v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 
1974), that consumption of alcohol which is remote in time is 
irrelevant and that such evidence should be closely scrutinized 
to avoid prejudice. The trial court clearly abused its discre-
tion in allowing the admission of such evidence. The admission 
of such evidence was, therefore, reversible error~ 
The majority of the alleged acts of negligence by Evan 
Pearce occurred prior to the emergency created by the negligence 
of Kevin Wistisen and cannot be cited as comparative negligence 
on the part of Evan Pearce. The acts of Evan Pearce which 
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occurred after Kevin Wistisen created the emergency clearly show 
efforts of Evan Pearce which were highly motivated by a desire to· 
secure his own safety. The presumption of due care for one's 
safety should have been presented to _the jury. The failur~ of 
the trial court to present the presumption was reversible error. 
The requested jury instruction concerning the requirement of 
an anchor was based upon the statutory requirement of Utah Code 
Ann. § 73-18-8 (1980) and 4 Utah Admin. R. § A60-0l-3(3)(b)(l2) 
(1975), and the rules and regulations promulgated by the Utah 
Division of Parks and Recreation. The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that rules and regulations of this nature are "one of the 
standards of the community in determining whether or not the 
defendants were negligent." Wheeler v. Jones, 19 Utah 2d 392, 
431 P.2d 985 (1967). Although the plaintiff requested such an 
instruction, no instruction given by the court touched on this 
requirement that an anchor be on board the boat or that a lack 
of an anchor would constitute negligence by the defendants. The 
court's failure to give an appropriate instruction on plaintiff's 
theory that an anchor was required aboard the boat constitutes 
prejudicial error. 
Respectfully submitted this _t.qf day of September, 1982. 
D. ID L ·~ 
HOWARD, LEWIS 
Attorneys for 
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